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The Constitutional Relationship Between the Central
Government and the Future Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government
Joseph YS. Cheng*
The constitutional relationship between the central government of thePeople's Republic of China ("PRC") and that of the future Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region ("SAR"), together with the polit-
ical system of the future Hong Kong SAR, are the most controversial
issues in the drafting of the Basic Law.' This Article will discuss a) the
relationship between the Basic Law and the Constitution of the PRC;2
b) the constitutional and legal status of the Hong Kong SAR in the
PRC's political system; c) the relationship between the central govern-
ment and that of the Hong Kong SAR as discussed in the drafting of the
Basic Law; and d) various issues that have to be further clarified in defin-
ing the relationship between the central government and that of the
Hong Kong SAR. This Article attempts to outline the position of the
PRC government on the relationship which has become increasingly
clear in the Basic Law's drafting process, to evaluate this position both
from a constitutional/legal and a political point of view, and to discuss
the response to the PRC position, especially the various alternatives
presented by the Hong Kong community in defense of its perceived
interests.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BASIC LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PRC
The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong
("Joint Declaration") indicates that the PRC's basic policies regarding
Hong Kong as stated in the Joint Declaration and elaborated in Annex I
* Lecturer, Department of Government and Public Administration, The Chinese University of
Hong Kong.
I For a brief account of the formation of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law
Consultative Committee, see A. CHEN, XIANGGANG FAZHI YU JIBENFA (Hong Kong's Legal Sys-
tem and the Basic Law) 236-63, (1986); J.Y.S. Cheng Hong Kong: The Pressure to Converge 63
INT'L AFFAIRS 272, 275-76 (Spring 1987).
2 XIANFA (Constitution) (People's Republic of China) [hereinafter P.R.C. CONST.] (adopted on
Dec. 4, 1982 by the Fifth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its Fifth
Session), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1983) (Beijing,
Foreign Language Press ed.).
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to the Joint Declaration "will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China,
by the National People's Congress ["N.P.C."] of the People's Republic of
China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years."3 The Joint Decla-
ration further points out that the PRC's decision to establish a Hong
Kong SAR was "in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China." 4
Article 31 of the PRC Constitution provides that "[t]he state may
establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to
be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law
enacted by the NPC in the light of the specific conditions." 5 In line with
this, the Constitution grants the NPC the power "to decide on the estab-
lishment of special administrative regions and the systems to be insti-
tuted there.",
6
In terms of the hierarchy of laws in the PRC, the Constitution "is
the fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority."7 The
basic laws, ordinary statutes, administrative rules and regulations en-
acted by the State Council,8 stand next in line followed by the local regu-
lations adopted by the people's congresses of provinces and
municipalities directly under the Central Government and their standing
committees.9 This hierarchy is strictly defined, and laws of a lower level
cannot contravene those of a higher level in the hierarchy.'°
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR belongs to the category of
"basic laws" as it will be promulgated by the NPC. A law similar to it in
status is the Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities of
the PRC, which was adopted on May 31, 1984 by the NPC. 11 This is a
basic law, and administrative rules and regulations enacted by the State
Council cannot contravene it. The Standing Committee of the NPC may
enact partial supplements and amendments to such statutes enacted by
3 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec.
19, 1984, United Kingdom-People's Republic of China, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmd 9352),
para. 3(12) [hereinafter Joint Declaration], reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1371 (within the British White
Paper referred to as the Draft Agreement).
4 Id. para. 3(1).
5 P.R.C. CONSTITUTION art. 31.
6 Id. art. 62(13).
7 Id. preamble (para. 13).
8 Id. art. 89(1).
9 Id. art. 100.
10 See SPECIAL GROUP ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND
THE SAR OF THE BASIC LAW CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, ZUIHOU BAOGAO: JIBENFA YU
XIANFA DE GUANXI (Final Report: The Relationship Between the Basic Law and the Constitution)
3 [hereinafter ZUIHOU BAOGAO]. The Final Report was adopted by the Executive Committee of the
Basic Law Consultative Committee on Feb. 14, 1987.
11 For full text of the law, see Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), June 4, 1984.
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the NPC, but it can only do so "when the National People's Congress is
not in session" and when such partial supplements and amendments "do
not contravene the basic principles of these statutes." 2
When compared with the Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority
Nationalities of the PRC, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR seems
to enjoy an even higher status since its drafting has been performed by a
Basic Law Drafting Committee whose membership list was approved by
the Standing Committee of the NPC and which is responsible to the
NPC or to its Standing Committee when it is not in session. 3 On the
other hand, there was no formal drafting committee formed for the Law
on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities of the PRC. It was
simply drafted by a group organized by the Nationalities Committee of
the NPC in coordination with other relevant units such as the State Na-
tionalities Affairs Commission under the State Council. The Law was
then considered by the Standing Committee of the N'PC and finally
adopted by the NPC. 4 Hence, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR,
which is to define in detail the relationship between the central govern-
ment of the PRC and that of the Hong Kong SAR, enjoys a very high
legal status in the PRC legal system which is just below that of the Con-
stitution. It follows, therefore, that the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
SAR may ignore provisions of other basic laws, statutes, administrative
rules and regulations enacted by the State Council and other local regula-
tions at the provincial level, and that it only has to be in accord with the
Constitution.
Ever since the ideas of "one country, two systems" and a Basic Law
for the Hong Kong SAR were first raised by PRC leaders, 5 the relation-
ship between the Basic Law and the PRC Constitution has been a serious
concern of the Hong Kong community. The idea of "one country, two
systems" is to allow Hong Kong's current social and economic systems
to remain unchanged. This promise by the PRC leadership was embod-
ied in paragraph 3(5) of the Joint Declaration.16 "One country, two sys-
tems" and other provisions will be stipulated in the Basic Law. The PRC
Constitution, however, clearly states that "the Chinese people of all na-
12 P.R.C. CONST. art. 67(3).
13 J.Y.S. Cheng, supra note 1, at 275.
14 Chang Hsin, Jibenfa yu Zhongguo Xianfa de Guanxi (The Relationship Between the Basic
Law and China's Constitution) at 3 (speech made to the Basic Law Consultative Committee, Apr.
19, 1986) (published by the Committee).
15 For a brief account of the background materials on the birth of the ideas of "one country,
two systems" and the Basic Law, see ZuIHOu BAOGAO supra note 10, at 1. See also YIGuo
LIANGZHI Yu TAIWAN (One Country, Two Systems and Taiwan) 22-25 (Li Da ed. 1987) (Deng
Xiaoping's statements to Mrs. Margaret Thatcher on the same subjects during their meeting on Dec.
19, 1984 in Beijing).
16 "The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so
will the life-style." Joint Declaration, supra note 3, para. 3(5).
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tionalities will continue to . . .follow the socialist road."' 7 A careful
examination of the following articles of the Constitution obviously casts
doubt on the ability of the Basic Law to provide for the continuance of
the capitalist system in Hong Kong for fifty years after its return to the
PRC in 1997. These constitutional provisions are:
Article 1 "The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under
the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and
based on the alliance of workers and peasants."' 18
Article 5 "The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the so-
cialist legal system. No law or admininstrative or local rules and regu-
lations shall contravene the Constitution."' 19
Article 6 "The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's
Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of pro-
duction, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective owner-
ship by the working people."
2 0
Even before the initialling of the Joint Declaration, various groups
in Hong Kong indicated to the PRC officials responsible for Hong Kong
affairs that the guarantee of a capitalist system in Hong Kong might be in
violation of the PRC Constitution; revision of article 31 of the Constitu-
tion was suggested.21 The PRC authorities apparently were reluctant to
discuss revision of the Constitution,22 but they were aware that some
form of assurance was necessary.
Two days after the initialling of the Declaration, Renmin Ribao
(People's Daily) published an article by Wang Shuwen, director of the
Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, to this ef-
fect. 23 At the end of September 1984, a pro-PRC Hong Kong newspa-
17 P.R.C. CONST. preamble.
18 Id. art. 1.
19 Id. art. 5.
20 Id. art. 6.
21 In December 1983, the Hong Kong Observers (a local political group) was invited to send a
delegation (of which the author was a member) to visit the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of
the State Council in Beijing to discuss the issue of Hong Kong's future. This point was raised to the
officials of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office including Li Hou and Lu Ping, Deputy Direc-
tor and Secretary-General respectively of the office. Another political group, Meeting Point, also
raised the issue during its Spring 1984 visit to Beijing, and in May 1984 released its position paper,
Xianfa Xiugai, Tiyiji Jibenfa Dagang (Cao'an) (Proposal on the Revision of the Constitution and A
Draft Outline of the Basic Law) [hereinafter Meeting Point Position Paper], collected in JIBENFA
MIANMIANGUAN (Perspectives on Basic Law of Hong Kong 63-78 (J.Y. Ye ed. 1984).
22 This was the attitude adopted by the PRC officials receiving the Hong Kong Observers and
Meeting Point delegations when the issue of revising the PRC Constitution was raised. The author
had lengthy discussions with the leading members of the Meeting Point delegation soon after its visit
to the P.R.C.
23 Wang, Sheli Tebie Xingzhengqu shi Woguo de Zhongyao Juece (The Establishment of Special
Administrative Regions Is an Important Policy Decision of Our Country), Renmin Ribao, Sept. 28,
1984.
Vol. 20:65
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
per, Wen Wei Po, published a discussion of the Joint Declaration-the
participants were Huan Xiang, adviser to the Hong Kong and Macau
Affairs Office and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qian Junrui,
adviser to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qian Jiaju, adviser to
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone; Pei Monong, deputy director of
the Chinese Institute of International Studies; and Ji Chongwei, execu-
tive director of the Economic Research Center of the State Counfcil.24
These experts attempted to provide an explanation for the coexistence of
the capitalist system and the socialist system in China; a theoretical ex-
planation, from a Marxist-Leninist point of view, of the "one country,
two systems" concept; the basis for the "one country, two systems" pol-
icy in the PRC Constitution; and an explanation of the practical need to
accept the "one country, two systems" policy.
According to these experts, the design of the "one country, two sys-
tems" concept emerged in late 1978 when Deng Xiaoping formulated his
policy for the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The message
from the Standing Committee of the Fifth NPC to the compatriots in
Taiwan on New Year's Day 1979 was the first step in implementing this
policy.2" When the question of Hong Kong's future emerged, PRC lead-
ers then applied this formula to persuade the British government and the
Hong Kong community to accept the PRC's recovery of the territory's
sovereignty and administration by 1997. Deng and these experts boasted
that the significance of the "one country, two system" policy lies in the
use of peaceful means to settle partitions of states, resolve international
conflicts, and maintain world peace. They claimed that their formula
might well apply to the German and Korean questions. In an attempt to
reassure the Hong Kong people, Qian Jiaju explained that in a "one
country, two systems" situation, "the Mainland does not want to 'swal-
low' Taiwan, and Taiwan cannot 'swallow' the Mainland; the case of
Hong Kong requires no further elaboration."26 Skeptics in Hong Kong
were quick to point out that the Mainland might want to "swallow"
Hong Kong at a later date and that no satisfactory guarantee exists to
deter it from doing so.
Huan Xiang further stated:
[S]ocialism is a fairly long historical stage; in this historical stage,
there is a process in which the capitalist system and the socialist sys-
tem co-exist .... In our country, there are three tiers of economic
forms: the reforming socialist economy, the special economic zone
economy, and specific capitalist economy...'. Therefore, the design of
24 The discussion took the form of a forum and was published in two parts. Wen Wei Po
(Hong Kong), Sept. 29, 1984; id. Sept. 30, 1984.
25 For the text of the message, see BEUING Rav., Jan. 5, 1979, at 16-17.
26 Wen Wei Po, supra note 24.
1988]
CASE W. RES. J INT'L Lo
"one country, two systems" has a theoretical base.27
Other participants in the discussion also elaborated on the fact that so-
cialism allowed the co-existence of various economic forms so as to de-
velop socialist productivity.28
Wang Shuwen's Renmin Ribao article mainly argued that the PRC's
basic policies regarding Hong Kong as embodied in the Joint Declaration
did not constitute violations of the PRC Constitution. Wang reasoned
that, since article 31 of the Constitution is an inalienable part of the Con-
stitution, conformity with article 31 means conformity with the Constitu-
tion, and not violating article 31 means not violating the Constitution.29
Wang's argument appears simple and reassuring, though not necessarily
logical.
Undeniably, the theoretical and constitutional arguments presented
in defense of the "one country, two systems" policy were not entirely
satisfactory. What was more convincing was the practical need to accept
the "one country, two systems" policy that these experts identified. The
participants in the discussion all agreed that the arrangement of "one
country, two systems" would contribute to the PRC's four moderniza-
tions; allow Hong Kong to maintain its various global links, particularly
those with the Asia/Pacific region; and help Hong Kong and the main-
land to adapt to each other. Naturally, when the values and goals of the
PRC leadership change, these practical needs may well be altered.
The view I hold is that the PRC Constitution should be revised to
further demonstrate the sincerity of the PRC leadership and to
strengthen the attraction of the "one country, two systems" policy to
Taiwan. 3° If that were the case, article 31 might stipulate that "within a
specified period of time, special administrative regions will not be bound
by certain provisions of the Constitution." From a legal point of view, a
constitution or a law with constitutional status may exempt certain re-
gions from the application of some or all of its provisions for a specific
period of time or under a specific set of circumstances. In terms of the
ideology of a socialist state, the constitution is part of the superstructure
and it may adjust to the situation and the needs of the different stages of
socialist development. In view of the new situation involving the task of
the reunification of China, a revision of the Constitution before the for-
mal promulgation of the Basic Law, perhaps in the coming NPC in 1988,
would not compromise the dignity of the PRC Constitution.
Furthermore, various statements of the PRC leaders and experts on
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Wang, supra note 23.
30 J.Y.S Cheng, Hong Kong: The Challenge of the Future, in HONG KONG SOCIETY: A
READER 271 (A.Y.H. Kwan & D.K.K. Chan eds. 1986).
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the concept of "one country, two systems" and its constitutional basis, as
well as the compatibility of the guarantees made to the PRC Constitu-
tion, should be presented in an authoritative manner as the official posi-
tion of the PRC government. The preamble of the Basic Law and the
statement of the NPC or its Standing Committee upon the adoption of
the Basic Law (such a statement has legal status in the PRC legal system)
are appropriate places for this authoritative statement.3" The inclusion
of the Basic Law as an appendix to article 31 of the Constitution might
also be considered. The advantage of this would be that it would give the
Basic Law a constitutional status and thus help to allay the concern over
its incompatibility with the Constitution; its disadvantage would be the
greater difficulty involved in amending the Basic Law. As well as the
theoretical and constitutional bases of the "one country, two systems"
policy, the major principles of Annex I of the Joint Declaration, in which
the PRC government elaborated its basic policies regarding Hong Kong,
might also be incorporated in the preamble and other relevant sections of
the Basic Law.32
It soon became very clear that PRC authorities were unwilling to
revise the Constitution. Shao Tianren, co-convenor of the Sub-group on
the Relationship between the Central Government and the SAR of the
Basic Law Drafting Committee and a legal expert of the PRC Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, indicated after a May-June 1986 meeting of the sub-
group that the proposal to rewrite article 31 of the PRC Constitution
would not be accepted.33 Shao felt that the Constitution should not be
altered too easily, and that the problem with previous Constitutions was
that there had been too many changes. He, therefore, would like to solve
the problem without having to amend the Constitution. Nonetheless, it
was acknowledged that a consensus existed in the sub-group on the need
to clarify the relationship between the Basic Law and the PRC Constitu-
tion in order to assure the Hong Kong community that socialism would
not be practised in the territory as prescribed by the Constitution. It was
suggested that the PRC authorities' reluctance to amend the Constitu-
tion is largely related to the concept of "saving face" and the considera-
tion that amendment of article 31 of the Constitution may imply that the
very provisions of the Joint Declaration were in violation of the Constitu-
tion as it stood in 1984.
On the other hand, there appears to be little resistance to an authori-
tative statement from the Standing Committee of the NPC upon promul-
gation of the Basic Law. Since it has the power ."to interpret the
31 See ZUIHoU BAOGAO, supra note 10, at 4.
32 See Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I (Elaboration by the Government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China of its Basic Policies Regarding Hong Kong).
33 Ming Pao (Hong Kong), June 2, 1986.
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Constitution and supervise its enforcement" 4 and "to interpret stat-
utes,""5 this presents an ideal opportunity for the clarification of the rela-
tionship between the Constitution and the Basic Law. It has been
suggested that the clarification may be based on the principle of "special
law taking precedence over general law" after identifying article 31 as a
"special law" or "proviso. 31 6
The Sub-group on the Relationship between the Central Govern-
ment and the SAR of the Basic Law Drafting Committee presented a
report to the Basic Law Drafting Committee meeting held in August
1987.17 The report was a draft of the relevant sections of the Basic Law.
Article 10 of chapter 1 ("General Principles") reads:
In accordance with Article 31 of the PRC Constitution, the policies
and systems of the Hong Kong SAR, including the social and eco-
nomic systems, the systems regarding the protection of basic rights and
freedoms, and the systems concerning administrative management,
legislation and the judiciary, are based on the stipulations of this law
[the Basic Law]. No law made by the legislature of the Hong Kong
SAR shall contravene this law.38
A provision such as this, together with a statement from the Standing
Committee of the NPC upon the promulgation of the Basic Law, are
probably as far as the PRC authorities are prepared to go in view of the
concern of the community over the incompatibility between the PRC
Constitution and the Basic Law.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE HONG
KONG SAR IN THE PRC's POLITICAL SYSTEM
As indicated above, the constitutional basis of the Hong Kong SAR
lies in article 31 of the PRC Constitution, whereas article 62(13) of the
Constitution provides the NPC with the power "to decide on the estab-
lishment of special administrative regions and the systems to be insti-
tuted there."39 The SARs therefore differ from the other constituent
units of the PRC whose systems are defined by the Constitution.' SARs
are presumably established on an ad hoc basis, probably for a limited
34 P.R.C. CONST. art. 67(1).
35 Id. art. 67(4).
36 ZUIHou BAOGAO, supra note 10.
37 For the text of the report, see Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), Aug. 23, 1987 (author's
translation).
38 Id. ch. 1, art. 10.
39 P.R.C. CONST. art. 62(13).
40 See id. arts. 95-111 (§ V: The Local People's Congresses and the Local People's Govern-
ments at Different Levels); id. arts. 112-22 (§ VI: The Organs of Self-Government of National
Autonomous Areas).
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period of time.g" Furthermore, the Constitution does not provide any
guidelines concerning the establishment of SARs by the NPC nor stipu-
lations to be observed by all SARs. Hence the Basic Law governing the
Hong Kong SAR is a law of its own category, and the possibility exists
that the Basic Law governing another SAR may differ substantially from
that for Hong Kong.
In contrast to the PRC's national autonomous areas, the power of
autonomy of SARs is not guaranteed by the Constitution,42 but stipu-
lated by basic laws promulgated by the NPC. (In the case of the Hong
Kong SAR, the Joint Declaration provides a further guarantee in its
form as an international agreement.) However, as the content of the
Hong Kong SAR's power of autonomy is to be defined by a Basic Law
promulgated by the NPC, this power of autonomy, from a constitutional
point of view, is of a lower order than that of the national autonomous
areas which is embodied in the Constitution. In terms of the actual pow-
ers enjoyed by the Hong Kong SAR, as outlined by Annex I of the Joint
Declaration and the draft articles of the Basic Law prepared by the sub-
groups of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and released to the pub-
lic,43 the Hong Kong SAR will enjoy a much higher degree of actual
autonomy than the present national autonomous areas of the PRC.
As a SAR under the sovereignty of the PRC, Hong Kong has been
warned against tendencies of becoming an "independent political en-
tity."'  The Joint Declaration states: "The Hong Kong Special Admin-
41 Deng Xiaoping met the Basic Law Drafting Committee in Beijing on Apr. 16, 1987. He said
that under the policy of "one country, two systems," Hong Kong would not change its capitalist
system for fifty years after 1997. He added that there would be no need for change foreven another
fifty years after that. See E. Lau, Now, Down to Basics-Deng Xiaoping Speaks Frankly on the Fu-
ture Running of the Territory, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 30, 1987, at 12-13. Deng's statement did
not cause much joy or enthusiasm in Hong Kong, instead the local community was uneasy with the
fact that a simple statement from the leader could easily alter what had been promised by an interna-
tional agreement reached after two years of negotiations.
42 For the rather limited scope of autonomy of the PRC's national autonomous areas, see
P.R.C. CONST. arts. 112-22 (§ VI The Organs of Self-Government of National Autonomous Areas).
43 For the text of the draft articles presented by the Sub-group on the Relationship Between the
Central Government and the SAR, see Ta Kung Pao, supra note 37. For the drafts presented by the
Sub-group on the Political Structure of the Hong Kong SAR the Sub-group on Education, Science,
Technology, Culture, Sport and Religion of the Hong Kong SAR; and the Sub-group on the Econ-
omy of the Hong Kong SAR, see id. Aug. 25, 1987. See also id. Aug. 24, 1987 (draft articles
presented by the Sub-group on the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Hong Kong Inhabitants).
44 On Sept. 9, 1984, Xu Jiatung, Director of the Hong Kong branch of the New China News
Agency, addressed the University Graduates' Association. Xu stated: "Hong Kong after 1997 will
not be a dependent territory of Britain, and will not be an independent political entity. Instead it will
become a highly autonomous SAR under the Chinese government, a part of the great Motherland."
Answering questions afterwards, Xu explained: "Being 'highly autonomous', Hong Kong still re-
mains a part of the Chinese government, while an 'independent political entity' is independent of
China. On this question, there is a view and a tendency that is worthy of your attention." See id.,
1988]
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istrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy.. .. " However,
a high degree of autonomy also means limited autonomy. The PRC gov-
ernment obviously will not change the existing unitary system into a fed-
eral one just for the reunification of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.
The idea of granting Hong Kong "residual power" which allows the
Hong Kong SAR full authority to handle its own affairs, except in for-
eign affairs and defense policy areas which are the responsibilities of the
central government in Beijing, has been raised by some groups in the
Hong Kong community.46 The suggestion, if accepted, will certainly af-
fect the absolute authority of the central government.
In a unitary system, the authority of a local government comes en-
tirely from the central government, and this authority, at least theoreti-
cally, may be changed or withdrawn at will by the central government.
In contrast, the central government and the local governments in a fed-
eral system have their respective authorities well defined in a constitution
which cannot be amended without the consent of a majority of the con-
stituent units of the federation. Thus, when the PRC government
promises in the Joint Declaration that it will enact a Basic Law "in ac-
cordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, stipu-
lating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region... and that Hong Kong's previous capital sys-
tem and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years,"'4 7 this implies
that, in these fifty years, a federal relationship will exist to a certain ex-
tent. Since the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law have to be approved
by the NPC48 and the Basic Law also has a limited time span of fifty
years, this arrangement should not be considered an infringement of the
PRC's unitary system of government. This arrangement certainly has
implications for Taiwan too. It is on this premise that Hong Kong peo-
ple have raised the legitimate demand that the Basic Law should stipu-
late clearly that, except in foreign affairs and defense policy areas, the
Hong Kong SAR has the sole authority to handle its domestic affairs.
Peng Zhen, chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC and
architect of the 1982 Constitution, explained the establishment of SARs
Sept. 10, 1984. (All major newspapers in Hong Kong published Xu's remarks, in their Sept. 10, 1984
editions.)
45 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, para. 3(2).
46 See, e.g., The Legal System Group of the Hong Kong Affairs Society, Women dui Jibenfa de
Yixie Kanfa (Some of Our Views on the Basic Law), in Meeting Point Position Paper, supra note 21,
at 79-90 (released on June 3, 1984). The December 1983 Hong Kong Observers delegation to Beijing
also raised the same demand. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
47 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § I.
48 See P.R.C. CONST. art. 67(14) (stating that the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress exercises the power "to decide on the ratification and abrogation of treaties and important
agreements concluded with foreign states"). The Joint Declaration was ratified by the National
People's Congress on Apr. 10, 1985. See Renmin Ribao, Apr. 11, 1985.
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in his report on the revision of the Constitution presented to the NPC in
April 1982. 4" He indicated that concerning the principles of maintaining
the state's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the PRC govern-
ment had a clear-cut stand-at the same time, it would allow a large
degree of flexibility regarding concrete policies and measures. Peng fur-
ther elaborated on the SAR's high degree of autonomy which included
the maintenance of the existing social and economic systems, life style
and external economic and cultural ties, etc. Mention of a political sys-
tem exercising the power of autonomy was conspicuously omitted.
It appeared that the PRC leadership was willing to tolerate the
maintenance of different systems in the SARs (mainly social and eco-
nomic systems), but was reluctant to stipulate their political systems
within the Constitution, thus making them part of the PRC's state struc-
ture. The SAR's political systems may differ from those in the PRC, but
they are of a temporary and ad hoc nature, and they are not protected by
the Constitution. The SAR's political systems are similar to that in Tibet
before 1959-a system which differed from those of other national auton-
omous areas but did not become part of the Constitution.50 According to
the PRC's orthodox, Marxist thought, the special features of minority
nationalities' societies are a reflection of their backwardness. Special ar-
rangements concerning national autonomous areas' political systems are
concessions, and not a recognition of the minority nationalities' rights to
have their own modes of development guaranteed by their powers of au-
tonomy embodied in their respective political systems.51 Concessions
may vary in extent, but as concessions they are fundamentally tactical
measures. As conditions change or when the PRC government's percep-
tion of the state of development of the national autonomous areas
change, the concessions made will be altered as will the degree of auton-
omy enjoyed. The Law on Regional Autonomy and Minority Nationali-
ties of the PRC adopted in 1984 reflects this line of thinking. Chapter six
of the Law dealing with "Higher State Organs' Leadership and Assist-
ance" clearly indicates the backwardness of national autonomous areas,
thus in need of "care" and "assistance" from higher state organs.52
Various promises made to the Hong Kong community in the Joint
Declaration, especially the pledge that "Hong Kong's previous captialist
49 For the text of his report, see Ta Kung Pao, Apr. 29, 1982.
5o See T. Chan, Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu yu Zhongyang Zhengfu de Guanxi (The Rela-
tionship Between the Hong Kong SAR and the Central Government), at 7 (paper presented to the
Conference on the Constitution and the Basic Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Nov. 28-Dec.
2, 1986).
51 T. Chan, Zhonggong de Minzu Quyu Zizhi Zhengce (The Communist Party of China's Pol-
icy on Nationalities' Regional Autonomy), CHUNG PAO MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 30-33.
52 For the text of the law, see supra note 11, ch. 6.
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system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years"5 3 are therefore
concessions of a tactical nature. It was not surprising therefore that the
PRC authorities rejected demands for "residual power" for the Hong
Kong SAR to be stipulated in the Basic Law. During the April 1986
Basic Law Drafting Committee meeting held in Beijing, there was con-
siderable discussion on the issue. A legal expert of the PRC and a mem-
ber of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, Zhang Youyu, indicated that
since Hong Kong had always been Chinese territory and the PRC gov-
ernment was only recovering its sovereignty by 1997, the relationship
between the central government and the future Hong Kong SAR was not
one existing in a federal system, and there was no issue of "residual
power."54 Li Hou, Deputy Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Af-
fairs Office and Secretary-General of the Basic Law Drafting Committee,
echoed Zhang's view. 55 Simon Li, former Justice of Appeal and a Hong
Kong member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, indicated that
since existing "residual power" in Hong Kong belongs to the British
crown, it should therefore belong to the central government in Beijing
when Hong Kong is returned to the PRC. 6 Clearly, those in the Basic
Law Drafting Committee advocating that the Hong Kong SAR should
exercise the "residual power" were a small minority.
With respect to the division of powers between the central govern-
ment and the SAR government, two concepts associated with "residual
power" also emerged, namely, the "grey area" and the "undefined
power/unspecified power."'57 The "grey area" refers to the fact that be-
tween the jurisdiction of the central government and that of the Hong
Kong SAR government there may be matters of an ambiguous nature
that do not clearly fall under either jurisdiction. This concept of "grey
area" arises from the Joint Declaration statement that "[e]xcept for for-
eign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central Peo-
ple's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, in-
cluding that of final adjudication."5 " The powers shared between these
two jurisdictions constitute the "gray area."
"Undefined power/unspecified power" refers to the fact that with
the passage of time, powers which are omitted by the Basic Law may
53 See Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § I.
54 Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), Apr. 20, 1986.
55 Id.
56 Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), Apr. 26, 1986.
57 See SPECIAL GROUP ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND
THE SAR OF THE BASIC LAW CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT ON RESIDUAL
POWER, 2-3; [hereinafter FINAL REPORT ON RESIDUAL POWER] (the Final Report was adopted by
the Executive Committee of the Basic Consultative Committee on Feb. 14, 1987).
58 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § I.
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become increasingly important and new areas calling for a clear-cut divi-
sion of power may arise. These powers which have yet to be revealed are
thus generally called "undefined power/unspecified power."
While the PRC authorities rejected granting "residual power" to the
Hong Kong SAR, they did not seem to be very interested in considering
these two related concepts. The Basic Law Drafting Committee in its
April 1986 meeting only agreed to include in the Basic Law in the section
on the relationship between the central government and the Hong Kong
SAR provisions dealing with "the other functions and powers given to
the Hong Kong SAR by the NPC and the State Council."59 This provi-
sion appeared in the draft presented at the August 1987 Basic Law Draft-
ing Committee meeting by the committee's Sub-group on the
Relationship between the Central Government and the SAR as article 9
of chapter 2 ("The Relationship Between the Central Government and
the Hong Kong SAR"): "The Hong Kong SAR may exercise other pow-
ers given by the NPC, the Standing Committee of the NPC and the State
Council."'  This, if implemented, would amount to the central govern-
ment exercising "residual power." Article 9 again reaffirms the ad hoc,
concessionary nature of the entire arrangement.
In line with the demand for "residual power" for the Hong Kong
SAR, various groups in Hong Kong also demanded that the power to
amend the Basic Law be vested in the Hong Kong SAR government. A
local political group, Meeting Point, suggested that the power to amend
the Basic Law should be vested in the Hong Kong SAR legislature;
amendments should be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the legisla-
ture, and approved by the Standing Committee of the NPC.6 t Since the
central government cannot formally initiate amendments, this proposal
would be in accord with the promise that "Hong Kong's previous capi-
talist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years."'62 The
arrangement would provide for the necessary revision of the Basic Law;
and as all amendments would have to be approved by the Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC, the PRC's sovereignty would not be compromised
and Hong Kong would be prevented from becoming an "independent
political entity."
The Basic Law Drafting Committee, however, agreed that the
power to amend the Basic Law should be vested in the NPC. In March
1987 when the Basic Law Drafting Committee's Sub-group on the Rela-
tionship between the Central Government and the SAR met in
Guangzhou (Canton), both co-conveners of the sub-group, Shao Tianren
59 Wen Wei Po, Apr. 26, 1986 (author's translation).
60 See supra note 37, ch. 2, art. 9.
61 See Meeting Point Position Paper, supra note 21, at 72.
62 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § I.
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and Huang Lisung (Rayson Huang), indicated that the procedure to
amend the Basic Law would be decided by the NPC and would not be
stipulated by the Basic Law.63 The Basic Law could only propose that
the Standing Committee of the NPC establish a committee consisting of
members from the PRC and Hong Kong to advise on the interpretation
and amendment of the Basic Law as well as on questions related to laws
made by the Hong Kong SAR legislature and sent to the Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC for recording purposes. They further pointed out that
no member had proposed a stipulation in the Basic Law of the procedure
for the Basic Law's own revision. (The Basic Law Consultative Commit-
tee's Special Group on the Relationship between the Central Govern-
ment and the SAR also proposed that a Basic Law Select Committee
should be set up under the NPC or its Law Committee."4) Both the cen-
tral government and the Hong Kong SAR should be represented in the
committee which would discuss ways of dealing with the "grey area" and
"undefined power/unspecified power." Presumably this select commit-
tee could also advise on the interpretation and amendment of the Basic
Law.)
The August 1987 draft of the Sub-group on the Relationship be-
tween the Central Government and the SAR dealt with the issue of
amending the Basic Law by granting that power to the NPC.65 The
power to propose bills to amend this law would belong to the Standing
Committee of the NPC, the State Council and the Hong Kong SAR.
Bills of amendment from the Hong Kong SAR would first have to have
the approval of a two-thirds majority of the deputies to the NPC from
the Hong Kong SAR, a two-thirds majority of the members of the Hong
Kong SAR legislature and the Hong Kong SAR chief executive, and
then be proposed to the NPC by the Hong Kong SAR delegation of dep-
uties to the NPC.66
Before bills of amendments concerning this law could be put on the
agenda of the NPC, they would first need to be studied by the Hong
Kong SAR Basic Law Committee which would also present its views.
No amendment of this law could contravene the established fundamental
guidelines and policies of the PRC towards Hong Kong.6 7
According to the aforementioned provision, the central government
of the PRC would have full control of the amendment process. A small
minority of the sub-group proposed that a three-quarters majority of the
members of the Hong Kong SAR legislature should be given the power
63 Ming Pao, Mar. 15, 1987.
64 See FINAL REPORT OF RESIDUAL POWER, supra note 57, at 6.
65 "The power to amend this law [the Basic Law] belongs to the National People's Congress."
See Ta Kung Pao, supra note 37, ch. 9, art. 2.
66 Id.
67 For the text of the draft article, see supra note 37.
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to propose amendments to the Basic Law, but it seems unlikely that this
proposal will have the support of the Basic Law Drafting Committee.68
The draft article mentioned a "Hong Kong SAR Basic Law Com-
mittee." In the explanatory notes to chapter 2 ("The Relationship Be-
tween the Central Government and the Hong Kong SAR"), where the
name of the committee first appeared, the sub-group indicated that the
committee was only a proposal, and that matters such as its establish-
ment, the organ to which it would be responsible, its duties and func-
tions, and its composition would have to be decided by the NPC.69
The power of interpreting the Basic Law is a more complicated mat-
ter, but its treatment here will be brief. Official interpretation of the law
in the PRC can be divided into three categories: legislative, judicial and
executive. Of these, the legislative form of legal interpretation is consid-
ered generally applicable and binding in all cases. The judicial and exec-
utive forms have, on the other hand, no such binding effect and carry the
force of law only in relation to the particular case under consideration by
the relevant judicial or executive body wherein the decision was reached
through an exercise of the respective forms of legal interpretation.70
Legislative interpretation is not only the most important mode of
legal interpretation in the PRC, it is in effect an authoritative supplement
and accretion to legislation. Furthermore, it is the only form of legal
interpretation stipulated in the PRC Constitution. The Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC has the power "to interpret the Constitution and su-
pervise its enforcement ' 71 as well as "to interpret statutes."' 72 Although
the Constitution does not empower the N-PC itself to undertake the task
of legislative interpretation, it may "alter or annul inappropriate deci-
sions of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress."173
Indeed, the principle of jurisprudence adopted in the PRC is that only
the enacting body or its representative or controlling organ is competent
to interpret any given piece of legislation in a manner which is generally
binding.
74
The idea that there may exist authoritative and binding forms of
legal interpretation other than those exercised by the judiciary, however,
is alien to the common law. Two controversial issues therefore have
emerged in the Basic Law Drafting Committee's deliberations on the
power of interpreting the Basic Law. They are: 1) Who has the power to
68 See id. (explanatory note following the draft article).
69 Id. (§ 3 of the explanatory notes preceding the draft articles.)
70 See D.L Fung, Interpretation of the Basic Law, 4 (paper presented to the Conference on the
Constitution and the Basic Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 1986).
71 P.R.C. CONST. art. 67(1).
72 Id. art. 67(4).
73 Id. art. 62(11).
74 D.R. Fung, supra note 70, at 5.
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determine whether a law passed by the Hong Kong SAR legislature does
or does not contravene the Basic Law? and 2) who has the power to
interpret the Basic Law? The first question arises from the Joint Decla-
ration provision:
The legislative power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be vested in the legislature of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. The legislature may on its own authority en-
act laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and legal
procedures, and report them to the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People's Congress for the record. Laws enacted by the legisla-
ture which are in accordance with the Basic Law and legal procedures
shall be regarded as valid.75
The question arises because the Joint Declaration is silent as to who will
determine whether any such law is "in accordance with the Basic Law
and legal procedures."
76
According to Martin Lee, a member of the Basic Law Drafting
Committee and the leading figure among advocates for democracy in the
territory, the majority view of the committee is that after a new law has
been reported to the Standing Committee of the NPC "for the record,"
someone in or authorized by the NPC Standing Committee will examine
it and decide whether or not it is "in accordance with the Basic Law and
legal procedures." If it is, then nothing needs to be done. If it is not,
then the Standing Committee can revoke it or send it back to the Hong
Kong SAR legislature for reconsideration. The Standing Committee it-
self, however, will not amend the law.77
The minority view, which has been articulated by Martin Lee and
his supporters, is to maintain the consistency of the common law system
to be practised in the Hong Kong SAR. Once a law is passed, it is up to
the judiciary to interpret it. Since the Hong Kong courts today assume
both jurisdiction in determining whether or not any law in the territory
contravenes the existing constitutional documents and the power, when-
ever necessary, to declare such a law to be null and void and of no legal
effect, it is consistent with present practice for the Hong Kong courts
alone to determine whether a new law passed by the Hong Kong SAR
legislature is "in accordance with the Basic Law and legal procedures."78
Lee further suggested a compromise: if the Standing Committee of
the NPC takes the view that any law passed by the Hong Kong SAR
legislature may not be "in accordance with the Basic Law and legal pro-
75 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § II.
76 Id.
77 M. Lee, The Significance of a Written Constitution for Hong Kong, reprinted in Ming Pao
(Hong Kong), Apr. 13-14, 1987 (speech at the Conference on the American Constitution and the
Hong Kong Basic Law: Some Comparative Observations, University of Hong Kong, Jan. 16, 1987).
78 Id.
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cedures," then such a question could be referred to Hong Kong's Final
Court of Appeal for determination. The jurisdiction thus conferred on
the Final Court of Appeal would only be advisory in nature.79 As to
what would happen if the opinion of the Final Court of Appeal were not
accepted by the Standing Committee of the NPC, Lee believed that there
were two alternatives.
First, the Standing Committee of the NPC could not challenge the
new law if it had been deemed "in accordance with the Basic Law and
legal procedures" by the Final Court of Appeal. If the decision had gone
the other way, then the law could be referred by the Hong Kong SAR's
executive authorities to the Hong Kong legislature for further considera-
tion and action. This alternative obviously respects the Hong Kong
SAR's "high degree of autonomy" promised by the Joint Declaration.80
The second alternative is that the Standing Committee of the NPC
could refuse to accept the opinion of the Final Court of Appeal, in which
case it would refer the law to a special committee for further considera-
tion. The committee would be set up under the NPC Standing Commit-
tee and consist of legal experts, the majority of whom should be from the
Hong Kong SAR. The NPC Standing Committee would be expected to
accept the opinion of this special committee. Lee felt that if the Standing
Committee still rejected such an opinion, then a constitutional crisis
would result-an undesirable consequence from all points of view.81
The majority of the Basic Law Drafting Committee also held the
view that it would be undesirable or even an infringement of the PRC's
sovereignty to allow the courts of the Hong Kong SAR to interpret those
parts of the Basic Law dealing with defense and foreign affairs, matters
reserved for the central government according to the Joint Declaration.
Lee's answer to that concern was that it is a common law principle that
acts of state are simply outside the courts' jurisdiction. The central gov-
ernment, therefore, has no need to fear that the courts of the Hong Kong
SAR would trespass into such areas pertaining to defense and foreign
affairs, thereby prejudicing the PRC's sovereignty or its rights over these
matters."'
The August 1987 draft of the Sub-group on the Relationship be-
tween the Central Government and the SAR provided for the interpreta-
tion of the Basic Law by the NPC Standing Committee in article 1 of
chapter 9.
The courts in the Hong Kong SAR could, in adjudicating cases before
them, interpret those articles of the Basic Law which fall within the
79 Id.
80 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, art. 3(2).
81 M. Lee, supra note 77.
82 Id.
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scope of the SAR's autonomy. When the NPC Standing Committee
has made an interpretation of the articles of the Basic Law, the courts
of the Hong Kong SAR shall, in applying such an article, follow the
interpretation of the Standing Committee of the NPC. Any adjudica-
tion made prior to an interpretation of the NPC Standing Committee,
however, will not be affected. The Standing Committee of the NPC
may consult the Hong Kong SAR Basic Law Committee prior to its
interpretation of the Basic Law.83
In line with the majority view of the Basic Law Drafting Committee
disclosed by Martin Lee, article 6 of chapter 2 also stipulates that "[t]he
Hong Kong SAR shall be vested with legislative power."84 Laws enacted
by the Hong Kong SAR legislature would be reported to the Standing
Committee of the NPC, but this reporting would have no effect on the
validity of the laws.
If the Standing Committee of the NPC, after consultation with the
Hong Kong SAR Basic Law Committee, considered any law of the Hong
Kong SAR not in accordance with this law (the Basic Law) or the legal
procedures, it would return the law for reconsideration or have it re-
voked. It would not, however, amend the law. Any law returned for
reconsideration or revoked by the Standing Committee of the NPC
would become null and void, but this invalidation has no retrospective
effect.85
The sub-group apparently did not find the common law principle
concerning acts of state assuring enough, and it certainly wanted to avoid
the kind of constitutional crisis which could arise if Lee's second alterna-
tive were adopted. The sub-group's choice was to let the Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC have the final say in interpreting the Basic Law and, in
fact, the scope of autonomy of the Hong Kong SAR as defined by the
Basic Law. This choice corresponded with the sub-group's previously
discussed decisions. Minor concessions were made, however, with re-
spect to the Hong Kong SAR's "high degree of autonomy": a Hong
Kong SAR Basic Law Committee with an advisory function was pro-
posed, and the interpretation of the Standing Committee of the NPC
would not affect the previous adjudications of the courts in the Hong
Kong SAR.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT
The Joint Declaration states: "The Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region shall be directly under the authority of the Central People's
83 See supra note 37, ch. 9 art. 1.
84 Id. ch. 2, art. 6.
85 Id.
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Government of the People's Republic of China .... "86 This was in-
tended to grant the Hong Kong SAR a status on par with the provinces,
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the PRC central
government; such a status would not only appeal to the Hong Kong peo-
ple's sense of pride, but would also serve to allay their fears of interfer-
ence from various ministries and provincial units of the PRC. 7
The draft presented by the Sub-group on the Relationship between
the Central Government and the SAR at the August 1987 Basic Law
Drafting Committee meeting reaffirmed the aforementioned provision in
a more specific manner. Article 1 of the draft's chapter 2 on The Rela-
tionship Between the Central Government and the Hong Kong SAR
states: "The Hong Kong SAR is a local administrative region of the
PRC with a high degree of autonomy. The Hong Kong SAR Govern-
ment is directly under the authority of the central people's govern-
ment. 8' 8 Article 11 of the same chapter further states:
The ministries and departments, as well as the provinces, autono-
mous regions and municipalities under the central people's govern-
ment shall not interfere in the affairs administered by the Hong Kong
SAR on its own in accordance with this law. The ministries and de-
partments of the central government, as well as the provinces, autono-
mous regions and municipalities, in establishing organs in Hong Kong,
must seek the consent of the Hong Kong SAR government and the
approval of the central people's government. These organs and their
personnel should observe the law of the Hong Kong SAR. People
from other parts of China entering into the Hong Kong SAR have to
apply for authorization.
The Hong Kong SAR may establish offices in Beijing.89
The only worry of the Hong Kong community is the lack of specifi-
cation as to which government has the power to authorize people from
other parts of the PRC to enter into the Hong Kong SAR.9° A more
satisfactory arrangement might require both the consent of the Hong
Kong SAR government and the approval of the central people's govern-
ment, as in the case of the establishment of organs in Hong Kong by
central ministries and local governments of the PRC. On the other hand,
86 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § I.
87 See SPECIAL GROUP ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND
THE SAR OF THE BASIC LAW CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT ON THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN THE SAR AND THE VARIOUS PROVINCEs/REGIONS (the Final Report was adopted
by the Executive Committee of the Basic Law Consultative Committee on Mar. 14, 1987).
88 See supra note 37, ch. 2, art. 1.
89 Id. ch. 2, art. 11.
90 See Hong Kong Standard, Aug. 24, 1987; Wah Gu Daily News, Aug. 24, 1987; id. Aug. 27,
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the central government may well be reluctant to seek the consent of the
Hong Kong SAR government when it deems it necessary to send people
to the Hong Kong SAR on various kinds of missions.
Article 1 of Annex I of the Joint Declaration provides "a high de-
gree of autonomy" for the Hong Kong SAR. It states:
Except for foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of
the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region shall be vested with executive, legislative and independent
judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The Central Peo-
ple's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region to conduct on its own those external affairs specified in
Section XI of this Annex.91
With respect to foreign and defense affairs, the August 1987 draft of
the Sub-group on the Relationship between the Central Government and
the SAR made the following provisions. Article 3 of chapter 2 states:
The central people's government shall be responsible for the for-
eign affairs related to the Hong Kong SAR.
The Hong Kong SAR shall be authorized by the central people's
government to conduct its own external affairs in accordance with this
law.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC shall establish an of-
fice in Hong Kong to handle foreign affairs.",
92
Article 4 of the same chapter provides:
The central people's government shall be responsible for the de-
fense of the Hong Kong SAR.
Military forces sent by the central people's govenment and sta-
tioned in the Hong Kong SAR for its defense shall not interfere with
the local affairs of the Hong Kong SAR. The Hong Kong SAR gov-
ernment, may in times of need, request the central people's govern-
ment for the assistance of the garrison in maintaining public order and
the relief of natural disasters.
Apart from the laws of the state, members of the garrison shall
also observe the laws of the Hong Kong SAR.
Expenditure for the garrison shall be borne by the central people's
government.
93
The handling of members of the garrison violating the laws of the Hong
Kong SAR is a complicated matter requiring more specific stipulations. 94
91 Joint Declaration supra note 3, Annex I, § I.
92 See supra note 37, ch. 2, art. 1.
93 Id. cl. 2, art. 11.
94 For Lu Ping's statement on the issue, see Ming Pao (Hong Kong), Dec. 2, 1986. Lu Ping is
the Deputy Secretary-General of the Basic Law Drafting Committee.
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Chapter 7, "The External Affairs of the Hong Kong SAR,"95 basi-
cally followed the provisions of section XI of Annex 1 of the Joint Decla-
ration.96 Since the Hong Kong SAR government is "authorized by the
central people's government to conduct its own external affairs," and
such external affairs are largely related to the maintenance and expansion
of Hong Kong's external economic ties essential for the SAR's stability
and prosperity, the PRC authorities have been generous in this authori-
zation as revealed in the draft articles of the Basic Law released in Au-
gust 1987.
In contrast to this generosity, the PRC authorities appear eager to
retain a measure of control regarding the political system of the Hong
Kong SAR. The problem is all the more serious since the Joint Declara-
tion did not attempt to define the political system for the future Hong
Kong SAR. The Joint Declaration merely states:
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive will be ap-
pointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results
of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will
be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region for appointment by the Central People's
Government.97
Annex I of the Joint Declaration further elaborates: "The legislature of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by
elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be
accountable to the legislature."98
Since the chief executive and the principal officials of the Hong
Kong SAR government will be appointed by Beijing, there is much local
concern as to whether this will amount to veto power by the PRC au-
thorities. The Basic Law may provide a practical check on the exercise
of any PRC veto and reduce the appointments to a symbolic act of exer-
cising sovereignty. If the Basic Law clearly provides for the election of
the chief executive by universal suffrage, then it will be almost inconceiv-
able for Beijing to reject his appointment. Furthermore, if the Basic Law
states that principal officials nominated by the chief executive must be
endorsed by the local legislature before they can be presented to Beijing
for formal appointment, then it will also be unlikely that their appoint-
ments will be vetoed.
Advocates of democracy in Hong Kong have proposed that candi-
dates for the post of the chief executive should be nominated by members
95 See supra note 37.
96 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § XI.
97 Id. para. 3(4).
98 Id. Annex I, § I.
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of the local legislature (say, one-tenth of the legislators), and then elected
by universal suffrage.99 They obviously hope that such a system will
render the appointment of the chief executive by the central people's gov-
ernment to a symbolic act of exercising sovereignty.
On the other hand, the conservative business community in Hong
Kong, represented by the Business and Professional Group of Members
of the Basic Law Consultative Committee, objected to a system of one
man-one vote as well as the election of the chief executive by the legisla-
ture. The group instead suggested that the chief executive be elected by
an electoral college composed of 600 members including members of the
Hong Kong SAR legislature; representatives of the Urban Council, Re-
gional Council and District Boards (existing local representative bodies
in the territory with limited powers); and a wide cross section of Hong
Kong's community leaders. This electoral college would elect a twenty-
member nomination committee from its membership, and the committee
would then nominate three candidates to be selected by the entire electo-
ral college. The successful candidate would be required to have the sup-
port of an absolute majority of the electoral college."° This complicated
system is largely seen as an attempt by the conservative business commu-
nity to secure a chief executive acceptable to the group and to Beijing.
As the election of the chief executive and the Hong Kong SAR legis-
lature are highly controversial issues having an important impact on the
political reforms in the territory in the transitional period, the Sub-group
on the Political Structure of the Hong Kong SAR avoided these two sig-
nificant topics in its draft articles presented to the Basic Law Drafting
Committee meeting in August 1987.101 Nonetheless, what is stipulated
in the Joint Declaration concerning the political system of the Hong
Kong SAR differs considerably from the political systems of the prov-
inces, municipalities and the autonomous regions of the PRC.
99 See Joint Committee for the Promotion of Democratic Political System Declaration, Nov. 2,
1986 (the Joint Committee is an umbrella group involving almost all political groups demanding for
democracy in Hong Kong). (Summaries of the declaration appeared in all major Hong Kong news-
papers, Nov. 3, 1986.)
100 See The Business and Professional Group of Members of the Basic Law Consultative Com-
mittee, A Proposal for the Future Structure of the Hong Kong SAR Government, 18-20 (1987).
Though the pamphlet was published Sept. 1987, the main points of the proposal had been reported
by the major newspapers in Hong Kong intermittently in 1986.
101 When the Sub-group of the Political Structure of the Hong Kong SAR of the Basic Law
Drafting Committee met in early Aug. 1987, Martin Lee accused other members of the sub-group of
deliberately ducking the sensitive issues of the selection of the chief executive and the constitution of
the legislature of the Hong Kong SAR; his statement led to sharp criticisms from other members of
the sub-group. For Lee's explanation of his position, see Hong Kong Econ. J. (Hong Kong), Aug.
15, 1987. For an attack on Lee, see Ta Kung Pao, Aug. 14, 1987 (Liu Yiu-chu interview). Liu is
also a member of the sub-group. For reports of the episode, see Wah Kiu Daily News, Aug. 9, 1987;
Hong Kong Econ. J., Aug. 14, 1987; S. China Morning Post (Hong Kong), Aug. 20, 1987.
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According to the Constitution of the PRC, local people's congresses,
at their respective levels "elect, and have the power to recall, governors
and deputy governors, or mayors and deputy mayors, or heads and dep-
uty heads of counties, districts, townships and towns."' 2 The Constitu-
tion further provides that "the standing committee of a local people's
congress at and above the county level... decides on the appointment
and removal of functionaries of state organs within the limits of its au-
thority as prescribed by law."' 3 According to article 9 of the Organic
Law of the Local People's Congresses and the Local People's Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China, revised by the Fifth Session of
the Fifth National People's Congress in 1982, the local people's con-
gresses have the power to remove members of the local people's govern-
ments at their respective levels."° Article 28(8) further provides the
standing committee of a local people's congress at or above the county
level the power to decide on the appointment and removal of the secre-
tary-general, agency heads, bureau directors, etc. of its corresponding lo-
cal people's government. Such appointments and dismissals have to be
reported to the local people's government at a higher level for recording
purposes.'0° Similar provisions exist for the organs of self-government of
national autonomous areas.
In the PRC's history, the appointment of the chief executive and the
principal officials of a local government by the central government only
occurred under extraordinary circumstances. In 1950, the Political
Council (Zhengwuyuan, the predecessor of the State Council) adopted
the "General Principles on the Organization of Provincial People's Gov-
ernment." 106 Article 2 of the document stipulated that appointees to
provincial governments would be nominated by the Political Council and
approved by the Central People's Government Committee; the article ex-
plained that the purpose of the arrangement was to establish rapidly the
revolutionary order during the early stage of liberation.' 0 7 The docu-
102 P.R.C. CONsT. art. 101.
103 Id. art. 104.
104 Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and the Local People's Governments of the
PRC, art. 9 [hereinafter Organic Law of Local Congresses & Governments] (revised according to
Resolution on Certain Revisions of The Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and the Local
People's Governments of the PRC, 5th National People's Congress, 5th Sess. (1979). See Renmin
Ribao, Dec. 16, 1982.
105 Organic Law of Local Congresses & Governments, art. 28(8).
106 Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Zuzhi Tongze (General Principles on the Organization of Provin-
cial People's Governments) [hereinafter General Principles on Provincial Organization] (adopted by
the Political Council in 1950), reprinted in PERSONNEL SYsTEMs BUREAU OF THE MINISTRY OF
LABOR AND PERSONNEL, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUZHi FAGUI XIANBIAN (Selected
Edition of Organic Laws and Regulations of the PRC) 216-17 (1985) [hereinafter P.R.C. ORGANIC
LAWS AND REGULATIONS].
107 General Principles on Provincial Organization, art. 2.
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ment was superseded by the formal promulgation of the first Constitu-
tion in 1954; it therefore remained valid only before the Constitution
came into existence. The second example is the "Brief Outline of the
Organization of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous
Region." 108 The preparatory committee was equivalent to a temporary
local people's government. Article 5 of the outline stipulated that the
appointment, removal and replacement of committee members were to
be based on nominations through consultations of the parties concerned,
which would then be approved by the State Council; the latter would
formally appoint the chairman, deputy chairmen and members of the
preparatory committee. 1° 9 The outline further stipulated that the heads
and deputy heads of various agencies, bureaus, etc. under the prepara-
tory committee would similarly be based on nominations through consul-
tations to be approved by the State Council." 0 It is believed that the
validity of the document lasted until the rebellion broke out in Tibet in
1959.
In those two examples, the central government had an even larger
measure of control over the local governments' personnel than is stipu-
lated by the Joint Declaration. But Hong Kong is certainly far more
stable than either the various provinces immediately after liberation in
1949 or Tibet in 1956. The situation in Tibet in 1956, nonetheless, has
some relevance for Hong Kong; the appointments of local government
personnel in Tibet by the central government had two important implica-
tions for Hong Kong. First, the central government might, if necessary,
help to establish a consensus among the diverse local interests, while al-
lowing a certain measure of autonomy for such interests. This occurred
in Tibet. Secondly, the autonomy promised Tibet was not yet constitu-
tional, and the central government was eager to retain the ultimate con-
trol. Appointment in this context also symbolized such control and the
PRC's sovereignty over the territory.
Above all, in actual practice, the Communist Party of China
("CPC") controls the appointments of local government personnel at all
levels, irrespective of the constitutional powers granted to the local peo-
ple's congresses. When control of the local Party organs is not yet secure
as in the three aforementioned cases, then the central government will
have to assume that ultimate control.
In the draft articles presented by the Sub-group on the Political
Structure of the Hong Kong SAR to the Basic Law Drafting Committee
meeting in August 1987, three provisions further expanded the central
108 Xizang Zizhiqu Choubei Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Jianze (Brief Outline of the Organization of the
Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region) (adopted in 1956), reprinted in P.R.C.
ORGANIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 106, at 318-20.
109 General Principles on Provincial Organization, art. 5.
110 Id. art. 10.
Vol. 20:65
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
government's power in the Hong Kong SAR's political system. Within
chapter 4, "The Political Structure of the Hong Kong SAR," the chief
executive is granted the power to dissolve the Hong Kong SAR legisla-
ture, subject to the approval of the central government. 1 I The same sec-
tion stipulates that members of the Executive Assembly (an organ to
assist the chief executive in the decision-making process similar to the
Executive Council today) shall be nominated by the chief executive and
appointed by the central government. 1 2 Finally, section 1 also states
that if the chief executive does not adopt the majority view of the Execu-
tive Assembly, then he should register his concrete reasons and report for
recording purposes. 3
These provisions aroused considerable opposition in the Hong Kong
community,11 4 and the sub-group appeared in its early-October 1987
meeting ready to accept amendments to these three draft articles. The
sub-group agreed that the chief executive could dissolve the legislature
after consulting the Executive Assembly without involving the central
government. A dissolution, however, should take place only under the
following circumstances: 1) when the legislature insists on passing a bill
rejected by the chief executive on the grounds that it jeopardizes the ma-
jor interests of the community; and 2) when the legislature repeatedly
refuses to endorse a budget. 5 According to the draft of chapter 4, "The
Political Structure of the Hong Kong SAR," presented by the sub-group,
some members suggested that the legislature could pass by a second two-
thirds majority vote a bill which it has earlier passed but has been re-
jected by the chief executive. 6 The sub-group also decided that the
chief executive should resign if the new legislature formed after the disso-
lution chose to pass the bill supported by its predecessor.' 1 7
The sub-group also indicated that members of the Executive Assem-
bly need not be appointed by the central government, thereby leaving the
power of appointment to the chief executive. Further, it also agreed that
the chief executive would not have to report his reasons for refusing to
adopt the majority view of the legislature to the central government for
111 See supra note 43, ch. 4, § 1, art. 5(13).
112 Id. art. 9.
113 Id. art. 10.
114 Martin Lee, for example, criticized the fact that these provinces would turn Hong Kong
into a Chinese colonyl See Hong Kong Econ. J., Aug. 13, 1987. A political group, the Hong Kong
Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, and the Current Affairs Committees of the
student unions of the two universities also voiced similar criticisms. See S. China Morning Post, July
30, 1987; Ming Pao, Aug. 24, 1987.
115 S. China Morning Post, Oct. 5, 1987; Ming Pao, Oct. 5, 1987.
116 See supra note 43 (explanatory note following ch. 4, § 1, art. 5(4)) (cl. 4, "The Political
Structure of the Hong Kong SAR").
117 See supra note 115.
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recording purposes. 118
While these amendments represent proper consideration for the
"high degree of autonomy" promised to the Hong Kong SAR, the sub-
group members from the PRC indicated in the same October 1987 meet-
ing that the PRC government could not accept the election of the first
chief executive of the Hong Kong SAR when the territory was still ad-
ministered by foreigners.11 9 Given the general consensus of the sub-
group-and indeed of all parties concerned- that the first chief execu-
tive should be elected well before July 1, 1997 so as to minimize the
changes at the time of transition, one would imply that the PRC authori-
ties would like to see the first chief executive selected through consulta-
tions rather than by election. 120
Apart from the fact that the chief executive and the principal offi-
cials of the Hong Kong SAR government will -be appointed by the cen-
tral government, thus implying a measure of accountability on their part
to the central government, it is also stated in chapter 4 of the August
1987 draft of the Sub-group on the Political Structure of the Hong Kong
SAR that the "chief executive of the Hong Kong SAR shall be responsi-
ble to the central people's government and the Hong Kong SAR in ac-
cordance with the stipulations of this law (the Basic Law)." 21 The
section also states that the chief executive shall "execute the orders is-
sued by the central people's government on matters concerned as stipu-
lated by this law." '122 At the same time, the PRC Constitution clearly
states that the State Council is the highest organ of state administra-
tion '  and it has the power "to exercise unified leadership over the
work of local organs of state administration at different levels throughout
the country, and to lay down the detailed division of functions and pow-
ers between the Central Government and the organs of state administra-
tion of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under
118 Id.
119 Ming Pao, Oct. 6, 1987.
120 Lu Ping, Deputy Secretary-General of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, indicated on
Oct. 6, 1987, that the PRC government would probably set up a committee under the Standing
Committee of the NPC consisting mainly of PRC officials and Hong Kong community leaders to
help set up the first Hong Kong SAR government. The committee, similar to the Basic Law Draft-
ing Committee, would be headed by a State Councilor and would most likely be set up by about
1996; the committee would then arrange for the selection of the first chief executive. Two days later,
Lu Ping also ruled out the possibility that the existing Legislative Council in Hong Kong would
automatically become the provisional legislature of the Hong Kong SAR on July 1, 1997. He con-
sidered that a provisional legislature would likely be set up on that date to prepare for the formation
of the first legislature by about 1998. There is speculation that the aforementioned committee under
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress will also play a key role in the formation
of the first legislature. See S. China Morning Post, Oct. 7, 1987; id. Oct. 9, 1987.
121 See supra note 43.
122 Id. art. 9.
123 P.R.C. CONST. art. 85.
Vol. 20:65
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
the Central Government."1 24
It is not sufficiently clear in what way and to what extent the Hong
Kong SAR differs from the provinces, etc. concerning its responsibility
to the central government. Is the Hong Kong SAR government also one
of the "local organs of state administration" as defined by the PRC Con-
stitution? Moreover, the State Council is one of the three parties empow-
ered by the Basic Law to propose amendments to the Basic Law.125
With the consent of the NPC, the State Council can seek to expand its
power vis-d-vis the Hong Kong SAR government. Article 1 of Annex 1
of the Joint Declaration is equally unclear. On one hand it states that
"the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly under
the authority of the Central People's Government," '126 and on the other
stipulates that "the executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall
be accountable to the legislature."' 1
27
A further complication arises because the draft of chapter 4 ("The
Political Strncture of The Hong Kong SAR") presented by the Sub-
group on the Political Structure of the Hong Kong SAR dealt with the
chief executive and the executive authorities in sections 1 and 2 respec-
tively. 1 28 As indicated earlier, article 1 of section 1 stipulates that the
chief executive shall be "responsible to the central people's government
and the Hong Kong SAR,"'' 29 but the whole section does not mention
that the chief executive has to be accountable to the legislature. On the
other hand, article 5 of section 2 stipulates that:
The executive authorities of the Hong Kong SAR shall abide by the
law and shall be accountable to the legislature of the Hong Kong SAR:
execute the laws passed by the legislature and which have become ef-
fective; present reports on the work of the administration to the legisla-
ture at fixed intervals; answer queries from members of the legislature;
and seek approval from the legislature on taxation and public
expenditures. 130
It appears, therefore, that the chief executive would not have to be ac-
countable to the legislature of the Hong Kong SAR, while only the exec-
utive authorities (not including the chief executive) would have to be
accountable to the legislature. This approach certainly is not in accord
with the general understanding of the Hong Kong community concern-
124 Id. art. 89(4).
125 See supra note 43, art. 2, ch. 9 (draft presented by the Sub-group on the Relationship be-
tween the Central Government and the SAR to the Basic Law Drafting Committee in August 1987)
(ch. 2 "The Interpretation and Amendment of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR").
126 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § I.
127 Id.
128 See supra note 43, ch. 4, § 1-2.
129 Id. § 1, art. 1.
130 Id. § 2, art. 5.
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ing the promise in the Joint Declaration that "the executive authorities
shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature."' 3 1
IV. OTHER ISSUES INVOLVED IN DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE HONG
KONG SAR GOVERNMENT
To a political scientist, the study of the PRC Constitution is of lim-
ited value as the role and functions of the Communist Party of China
("CPC") are largely omitted from the document. Similarly, an attempt
to analyze the constitutional relationship between the central govern-
ment and the future Hong Kong SAR government has serious limitations
without development of a good understanding of the future role of the
CPC in the Hong Kong SAR, which, unfortunately, is at the moment a
matter of sheer speculation at best. 132
Local organs of state administration in the PRC are involved in two
systems of accountability. 133 The Light Industry Bureau of a province
has to be accountable to the provincial people's government which, in
turn, has to be accountable to the provincial people's congress. The bu-
reau, however, has to be accountable to the Ministry of Light Industry at
the State Council level too. Parallel to the system of state administration
is the hierarchy of CPC organs. The provincial Party committee nor-
mally has an office (and a deputy secretary) in charge of industry and
transport which has jurisdiction over the Light Industry Bureau; the pro-
vincial Party committee is accountable to the Secretariat of the Central
Committee of the CPC as well as to the Political Bureau of the Party. In
addition to this complicated nexus of ties, there are Party groups within
organs of state administration. For example, Party members among the
senior officials of the Light Industry Bureau form a Party group of the
bureau which is accountable to the provincial Party committee.
It is not expected that this complicated system will be borrowed by
the Hong Kong SAR government. What needs to be highlighted here is
131 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex 1, § I. See, eg., Hong Kong Econ. J., supra note
114 (views of Martin Lee). The limitations on the legislative power of the Hong Kong SAR govern-
ment and on the judicial power of the courts of the Hong Kong SAR result from the power of Basic
Law interpretation being vested in the Standing Committee of the NPC have been discussed above.
See supra part III.
132 For an account of the activities of the CPC and PRC organs in Hong Kong, see LOONG
SIN, XIANGGANG DE LINYIGE ZHENGFU (A Shadow Government of Hong Kong) (1986) (Loong
Sin is a pseudonym) (1986 publication date is author's estimation). See also E. Lau, Positioning for
Power, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 6, 1987, at 26, 26-29; E. Lau Grasping the Grassroots, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Aug. 6, 1987, at 26, 26-27.
133 See F. SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 105-219 (2d
ed. 1968). (Schurmann's book is obviously a bit outdated, but chs. 2 & 3 still provide a good concep-
tual framework for understanding the Party and the state administrative systems in the PRC and
how they interact.)
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that within the PRC problems that arise from the dual accountability on
the part of a local organ of state administration are normally resolved by
the Party committee at the corresponding or higher level. It is not clear
what will happen if conflicts arise between the Hong Kong SAR chief
executive's accountability to the central government and his accountabil-
ity to the local legislature.
The Hong Kong and Macau Work Committee probably will have a
role in resolving such conflicts, at least its views will be sought by the
State Council or the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee which
will make the final decisions. The Hong Kong and Macau Work Com-
mittee is the CPC organ in Hong Kong and Macau, and its status is
equivalent to that of a provincial Party committee.1 34 Ever since the
1950s, the director of the Hong Kong branch of the New China News
Agency (Xinhua) also serves as the secretary of the Committee. Xu
Jiatun, the present director of the Hong Kong New China News Agency
branch, was first secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee
and a member of the CPC Central Comittee before he took up his post in
Hong Kong. It was then considered that given the presence of a consid-
erable number of senior PRC cadres in Hong Kong working in the Bank
of China's Hong Kong branch, China Resources (a trading conglomerate
directly under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade),
etc., a cadre with Central Committee membership would be required to
coordinate the various lines of activities of the Party and the state admin-
istration in Hong Kong. What kind of influence such a high-ranking
Party cadre would have on the Hong Kong SAR chief executive is diffi-
cult to assess today.
It is unlikely that the Basic Law will prescribe the role of the CPC
or that of the Hong Kong branch of the New China News Agency in the
Hong Kong SAR. Xu Jiatun, however, indicated to a group of Hong
Kong journalists at a June 1987 off-the-record briefing that the future
role of the CPC in Hong Kong would be "to assist the SAR
government." 135
Similarly, a Hong Kong SAR Basic Law Committee would proba-
bly be set up under the NPC, as hinted by the draft articles of the Basic
Law. At present, the process whereby Hong Kong members of the NPC
are chosen is unknown to the Hong Kong community. An educated
guess is that they are selected through consultations among the CPC and
the PRC organs in Hong Kong, with the Hong Kong and Macau Work
Committee and the New China News Agency branch both playing a key
134 See supra note 132.
135 E. Lau, Positioning for Power, supra note 132, at 26.
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role. 13 6 How the Hong Kong NPC members will be elected after 1997
when the PRC authorities can hold elections in the SAR again will not
be covered by the Basic Law as this remains the prerogative of the Or-
ganic Law of the NPC of the PRC. 3 7 The extent to which this commit-
tee should be consulted by the Hong Kong SAR government, and the
degree of influence it will have on the Hong Kong SAR government are
similarly left to speculation. It is not unnatural that Hong Kong mem-
bers of the NPC should demand a role in the Hong Kong SAR govern-
ment. If they are elected by methods similar to those applied for the
elections of members of the Hong Kong SAR legislature, then they cer-
tainly also have a legitimate claim to represent the people of the SAR.
Recently there have been signals from PRC officials in charge of
Hong Kong affairs that the first Hong Kong SAR government (probably
including the legislature) would likely be set up by a committee under the
Standing Committee of the NPC headed by a State Councilor. 138 The
first government would then be formed in a way significantly different
from that stipulated by the Basic Law-the element of democracy in-
volved would be correspondingly less while the measure of control en-
joyed by the central government of the PRC would be correspondingly
higher.
Meanwhile in the transitional period, the CPC is stepping up its ac-
tivities in the territory and seeking to establish itself as the dominant
political force. 139 It began publicly building its Hong Kong community
network and influence in 1985 when the Hong Kong branch of the New
China News Agency opened three district offices in Hong Kong, Kow-
loon and the New Territories. Pro-Beijing political forces have been
mounting a campaign to block the introduction of direct elections to the
Legislative Council in 1988.""4 They have also begun to mobilize their
supporters, identify candidates and isolate political opponents in prepara-
tion for the District Board elections in March 1988 and the Legislative
Council elections the following September.
Since the conclusion of the Joint Declaration, the local New China
News Agency and pro-Beijing organizations have been engaging in an
all-embracing united front campaign to win the hearts of Hong Kong
people. There have been numerous rounds of receptions, cocktail parties
and trips to China. To a certain extent, the Chinese organs in Hong
136 For lists of the Hong Kong and Macau members of the National People's Congress and the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, see LOONG SIN, supra note 132, at 119-20.
137 For the text of the law, see Renmin Ribao, Dec. 15, 1982.
138 See supra note 120.
139 See J.Y.S. Cheng, Hong Kong: The Decline of Political Expectations and Confidence, Aus-
TRALIAN J. OF CHINESE AFFAIRS; (forthcoming); see also E. Lau, Positioning for Power, supra note
132, at 26-29; E. Lau, Grasping the Grassroots, supra note 132, at 26-27.
140 E. Lau, Yes, We Want No Elections, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 17, 1987, at 21.
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Kong have been successful in co-opting businessmen, professionals,
fledging politicians and grassroots community leaders, who are flattered
by the embrace of the motherland and at the same time afraid to reject it.
A prominent sign of the united front's success is the expanding list of
dignitaries on the organizing committee of the Chinese National Day
celebrations, membership of which is now considered a symbol of patri-
otism, identification with the motherland and an indication of recogni-
tion by the PRC authorities.
Such united front activities tend to reduce Beijing's supporters to
mere mouthpieces and are already having a damaging effect on freedom
of expression. As the PRC authorities become more and more intolerant
of dissenting views, one of the aims of the united front strategy has been
to isolate opponents and make their views irrelevant. To this end, they
have been much facilitated by the self-censoring local mass media which
is increasingly inclined to avoid sensitive political issues.
The middle class and the intelligentsia, however, are alarmed by this
expanding influence from the PRC. This influence is now largely exer-
cised through the offices of co-opted business leaders and professionals;
but it is expected to expand into the political, economic and social are-
nas. This raises doubts not only about autonomy and self-administra-
tion, but also about the very concept of "one country, two systems"
which requires certain insulation of Hong Kong from the rest of the
PRC.
This brief discussion is obviously not intended to be a detailed analy-
sis of the political factors shaping the relationship between the central
government and the future Hong Kong SAR government; it is only
hoped that it will arouse an awareness of these political factors as well as
the limitations relating to analysis of the constitutional aspects of the
relationship. The PRC's increasing involvement in the Hong Kong econ-
omy will have a significant impact on the relationship between the cen-
tral government and the future Hong Kong SAR government too, an
important subject which is not dealt with in this Article.
V. CONCLUSION
The PRC leaders' sincerity in maintaining Hong Kong's stability
and prosperity now and after 1997 is beyond doubt- otherwise they did
not need to take the trouble to hammer out the Joint Declaration and a
Basic Law for the Hong Kong SAR. The concern with maintaining the
prosperity of the territory, however, clearly takes precedence over the
promises of "a high degree of autonomy" and "self-administration" for
the SAR.
The refusal to revise the PRC Constitution means that the problems
raised in the first section of this Article will remain unsolved. This may
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not pose too serious a problem if the present policy orientation of the
PRC leadership is maintained; after all, the reformers in the PRC today
also encounter difficulties finding a convincing ideological foundation to
support their reforms.141 In the event of political conflicts in Beijing
leading to uncertainties concerning the previously followed policy pro-
grams or even major redefinitions of them, the shock for Hong Kong
would be considerable-the theoretical and constitutional bases of "one
country, two systems" policy would be in doubt.
In the course of drafting the Basic Law, it has become clear that the
central government of the PRC often wants to retain final control, espe-
cially in matters related to the political system. The decisions on the
concept of "residual power," the amendment and the interpretation of
the Basic Law are significant examples. The result appears to be that the
Basic Law will offer very limited guarantees for the political autonomy of
the Hong Kong SAR. The instinct of the communist regime following
the Leninist principles of democratic centralism to be in control may well
be at work here: when the control of the CPC is not secure in the Hong
Kong SAR, the ultimate control of the central government has to be
defined even more clearly in legal terms. Suspicions regarding Hong
Kong becoming an "independent political entity" have been openly ar-
ticulated by PRC officials in charge of Hong Kong affairs, and they as
well as the PRC leadership must continuously be aware of the example
that the Hong Kong SAR sets for the rest of the PRC. It cannot be
conceived that the PRC leaders will dilute the unitary system of the state
to accommodate Hong Kong or even Taiwan. Any concessions made are
likely to be of a temporary, ad hoc and therefore tactical nature.
Within the Hong Kong SAR political system, the appointment by
the central government of the chief executive and the principal officials
implies their accountability to the central government. This has been
reaffirmed by the draft articles of the Basic Law stipulating that the chief
executive shall be "responsible to the central people's government and
the Hong Kong SAR."142 Conflicts between his respective responsibili-
ties to the central people's government and to the Hong Kong SAR
therefore may occur in the future. The substantial powers of the chief
executive, his appointment by and accountability to the central govern-
ment, and the lack of specific provisions in the draft Basic Law concern-
ing his accountability to the legislature, on the other hand, have
contributed to the emerging perception that Hong Kong will be treated
as a colony of the PRC. 143
141 See R. Delfs, Ideological Inconsistencies, FAR. E. ECON. REV., Oct. 8, 1987, at 50; see also
R. Delfs, In Search of a Socialist Theory, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 8, 1987, at 50.
142 See supra note 43, draft ch. 4, § 1, art. 1 ("The Political Structure of the Hong Kong SAR"
presented by the Sub-group on the Political Structure of the Hong Kong SAR in Aug. 1987).
143 See supra note 114. Incidentally, Ronald Li, chairman of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange,
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While the future role of the CPC in Hong Kong, that of the New
China News Agency branch and that of the Hong Kong members of the
NPC will be important factors affecting the relationship between the cen-
tral government and the Hong Kong SAR government, they will not be
prescribed by the Basic Law. The increasing presence and participation
of PRC authorities in the Hong Kong economy and society, together
with the stepping up of the united front activities of the local Party and
state organs, will likely result in the creation of a dominant political force
in the Hong Kong SAR which can be mobilized at will at the order of the
central government. These developments certainly do not augur well for
the political autonomy of the Hong Kong SAR, nor for the development
of a democratic political system there.
In the final analysis, the Hong Kong community may have to count
not so much on the Basic Law but the following domestic and interna-
tional factors to ensure the observance by the PRC leadership of its
promises made to the Hong Kong people during the negotiations for the
Joint Declaration. In the first place, the PRC leadership has been assur-
ing the international community in recent years that its open-door policy
will remain unchanged in the long term and, somehow, its policy towards
Hong Kong has also been looked upon as a litmus test of its open-door
policy. Any violation of the spirit and the terms of the promises made to
Hong Kong would hurt the capitalist world's confidence in the PRC.
Secondly, as a SAR under the PRC's sovereignty, Hong Kong will have
a significant instructional effect on Taiwan. Thirdly, a change in the
PRC's policy towards Hong Kong might have a prognostic effect on its
domestic economic reforms too; various liberal economic policies in the
special economic zones and the coastal cities would most likely be af-
fected. Finally, as long as the PRC leadership values Hong Kong's con-
tributions to its modernization program, this capitalist enclave may
continue to be tolerated. All of these factors, however, do not constitute
an absolute guarantee that Hong Kong will remain unchanged up to
2047. Moreover, these factors will be more effective to ensure "that
Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain un-
changed for 50 years" than to guarantee the "high degree of autonomy"
promised. 144
made the following statement at an international investment conference: "Hong Kong is a colony.
It is a dictatorship, although a benevolent one. It is and has been a British colony, and it's going to
be a Chinese colony, and as such it will prosper. We do not need free elections here." S. China
Morning Post, June 17, 1987.
144 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex 1, § 1.
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